DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA
by James A. Schnur
During most of its existence, the Pinellas County School Board operated separate and unequal
school systems based upon race. School officials did not act in isolation: executive, legislative,
and judicial pronouncements at the federal and state levels, compelled the district to codify Jim
Crow practices. Furthermore, the school board maintained segregated facilities until regional and
national influences assisted local leaders in their battle to dismantle dual schools. The movement
in Pinellas County exemplified a larger struggle between integrationists and segregationists. Both
groups knew that education shaped society, but each hoped to create an essentially different
community. This study of the battle to formulate a unitary system of public schools in Pinellas
County assesses the role of individuals, organizations, and government officials.
By the time Pinellas residents seceded from Hillsborough County in 1911, a new constitution
and state laws had segregated the peninsula’s common schools. The Hillsborough Board of
Public Instruction permitted John Donaldson, the earliest black settler on the southern Pinellas
peninsula, to enroll his children at Disston School in the 1870s. But after the Compromise of
1877, Democratic politicians abrogated the constitutional rights guaranteed to blacks during
Reconstruction. Article XII, Section 12 of the 1885 Florida constitution legitimized school
segregation by stating that “white and colored children shall not be taught in the same school, but
impartial provision shall be made for both.” Local school officials followed the state constitution
by opening the St. Petersburg Negro School in 1893. Two years later, legislators in Tallahassee
enacted a statute prohibiting any school from boarding or teaching whites in the same facility as
blacks.1
The state superintendent of public instruction and court decisions further strengthened the
policy of racial segregation. In his 1894-1896 biennial report, Superintendent William N. Sheats
asserted that “the Christian people of this State are conscientious and sincere in their belief that
the races ought not to be educated together.” Paternalistically, he believed that white taxpayers
and philanthropists would continue to offer financial support to black schools only if the races
remained in separate classrooms. In the landmark Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896, the
United States Supreme Court adjudged that “separate but equal” facilities did not infringe upon
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ten years later
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Patterson v. Taylor reaffirmed state-sanctioned segregation.
In 1912 the newly-created Pinellas Bond of Public Instruction operated twenty-two schools, four
of which served black children.2
Similar to other districts in Florida, Pinellas County schools failed to offer black students the
same opportunities accorded to their white counterparts. Although Dixie M. Hollins, the county’s
first superintendent of public instruction, hired many talented black teachers from the Tuskegee
and Hampton institutes, these teachers faced formidable curricular and financial barriers. While
the district funded nine-month terms and offered instruction through the high school level to
white pupils, blacks attended school only six months annually and could not progress beyond the
eighth grade. Coursework for blacks centered on manual training and domestic science rather
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than academic disciplines. School officials expected black education to meet the white
community’s needs by emphasizing industrial skills such as broom making, sewing, mending,
and laundering. Until 1927, black children sang and performed to raise additional dollars to keep
schools open for the entire six-month term.3
Segregation laws exacerbated disparities between black and white facilities. State statutes
expressly forbade any integration in dual school systems other than the hiring of white
supervisors to oversee black schools and teachers. After the state’s economy faltered in 1926 and
fewer whites subsequently moved to Pinellas County, the school board converted an unopened
white elementary school on a four-acre parcel in central St. Petersburg into Gibbs Junior-Senior
High for black students. Gibbs opened without electrical lighting or adequate equipment. By the
early 1930s, the district erected Pinellas Junior-Senior High, a concrete shanty for blacks
residing in northern Pinellas County. Although enrollment immediately exceeded capacity at
both schools, officials refused to expand the campuses or utilize empty facilities in white
neighborhoods. Thus, when the school board vacated the newly constructed Rio Vista
Elementary in 1935 due to low student enrollment, it illustrated that it would allow a facility to
fall into disrepair rather than permit black students to attend school in a white subdivision.4
While the district used buses to transport white children to segregated schools during the 1930s
and 1940s, it did not offer transportation for blacks. The school board assigned buses to white
children who lived beyond walking distance from their neighborhood schools, but expected
African-Americans to provide their own transportation. The fact that buses loaded with white
pupils passed nearby Gibbs en route to other schools angered Principal George W. Perkins.
When Perkins sought buses for blacks living more than two miles from Gibbs, the school board
denied his request. Perkins and the Gibbs faculty then purchased buses without school board
funding. Because the district never compensated the Gibbs staff for the buses, drivers had to
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collect exorbitant fares from the children.5 Thus in terms of curriculum, funding, facilities, and
transportation, the Pinellas Board of Public Instruction maintained two inherently unequal school
systems.
The Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. the Board of Education threatened the
institutionalized segregation found in Pinellas schools. Asserting that public education had
become one of the government’s chief responsibilities during the twentieth century, the Court
unanimously contended that dual school systems based upon race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because this class action decision involved numerous areas with differing local
conditions, the Court withheld a final verdict until states could file additional briefs.6
The black community heartily welcomed the first Brown opinion. James A. Bond, Pinellas
County's supervisor of Negro education, proclaimed that the decision would dismantle the caste
system which had pervaded race relations throughout American history. He did not foresee the
riots and calamities predicted by segregationist doomsayers. While many African-Americans
adopted a cautious “wait-and-see” attitude, most believed the Court took an important step by
making the government conform to its constitutional principles. The Reverend Enoch Davis
concluded that the justices needed to overturn Plessy to restore public faith in the federal system.
Although St. Petersburg Junior College – a postsecondary institution operated by the school

board – refused to admit two black co-valedictorians of Gibbs High School for the 1954 fall
term, Principal John Rembert commended school officials for taking “a sane, unhysterical.
Approach” to the decree. After the Court reheard arguments, blacks in Pinellas County eagerly
anticipated the second Brown decision.7
However, the second Brown decision in 1955 failed to provide timely redress for the
inequalities caused by segregation. Instead of establishing a definite schedule for desegregation,
the justices mandated “prompt and reasonable compliance. . .with all deliberate speed,” and
ordered lower courts to consider local conditions when enforcing the decision. Therefore, the
1955 Brown opinion did not answer three important questions: when desegregation should begin,
how school systems should abide by the 1954 verdict, and when complete desegregation would
become mandatory.8
Officials at the state level refused to comply with the ambiguous ruling. Governor LeRoy
Collins and Attorney General Richard Ervin appointed members to the Fabisinski Committee, a
panel of jurists who sought legal means to circumvent Brown. In the 1956 “School Assignment
Law,” the committee decided to maintain the state’s public schools, determine the best
educational interests for pupils, and mitigate hostilities between classes or groups of citizens.
This law required local school boards to enroll pupils based on orderly and efficient
administration, effective teaching, and the consideration of general welfare. The committee
permitted local districts to perpetuate segregation by classifying students on criteria other than
race, such as aptitude and scholastic proficiency. One member of the committee argued that the
Supreme Court construed the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require
equal, not identical, facilities. When the legislature failed to enact a constitutional school-closing
measure, Florida’s school superintendent placed the responsibility for desegregation on
individual county boards of instruction.9
Ingrained patterns of segregation existed at the administrative level as well as in the individual
classrooms of Pinellas schools. As late as 1940, the district stored records of currently employed
teachers in separate files based upon race. In the 1954-55 directory, white supervisors and school
faculty listings preceded those of black supervisors and schools. The only “integration”
accomplished immediately after Brown occurred when the 1955-56 directory arranged supervisor
and school faculty listings in alphabetic order. An advisory committee created to study petitions
filed by black parents considered alternative zone systems, but Superintendent Floyd T. Christian
thought the courts would permit Pinellas schools to remain segregated if the district acted in
good faith to upgrade facilities in black neighborhoods. Realizing that organizations such as the
National Urban League could offer proof that the school board knowingly operated overcrowded
and substandard schools for blacks, district officials decided to respond to Brown by constructing
Gibbs Junior College and nine new black schools between 1954 and 1963. By September 1956,
Christian boasted that such improvements made schools "separate but really equal."10
When school officials evaluated community attitudes towards desegregation in August 1955,
they discovered that many white leaders supported massive resistance. The White Citizens
Council of Pinellas presented appeals from white parents who called for continued segregation.
A county political leader pledged to establish a private tutoring system for students who did not
want to attend integrated schools. The Board of Control, which supervised Florida’s state

universities, published an alarming report which included surveys of white and black high school
seniors. Nearly two-thirds of Pinellas County’s white respondents believed the state should use
legal means to deny blacks admission to state universities. By comparison, over ninety percent of
the African-Americans replied that the state should integrate these institutions. In line with white
resistance, Pinellas County School Board members rejected a plan by a University of Florida
political scientist to desegregate the first two grades in September.11
Given the resistance of white officials, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and religious organizations initiated the struggle to abolish dual schools in
Pinellas County. Under the leadership of Dr. Ralph Wimbish, the local branch of the NAACP
joined with the United Churches of St. Petersburg and the St. Petersburg Ministerial Association
to dismantle Jim Crow legislation.12 White supremacists responded by carrying wooden replicas
of rifles and threatening integrationists. One minister found a message attached to a rifle which
proclaimed: “Death to all race mixers! Keep your public schools white by massive armed force –
Be a Paul Revere! Rally your neighbors to arms. Shoot the race-mixing invaders.”13 Such threats
strengthened the NAACP’s resolve. In the fall of 1959, an NAACP attorney accompanied eleven
blacks who sought admission to the first classes offered at Dixie Hollins High School.
C. Bette Wimbish, Dr. Ralph Wimbish’s wife, also became involved in the movement. She
protested against overcrowded black facilities as well as the district’s halfhearted solutions to
problems facing black students. Although state regulations required forty-acre parcels for senior
high school campuses, the school board intended to construct a new black high school on a
two-acre site in Campbell Park. In March 1960, Wimbish ran for a seat on the school board.
Although she lost the election, she garnered 10,000 votes in an area with only 3,800 black
electors.14
Although boycotts and other protests led to the peaceful desegregation of many of St.
Petersburg's stores and lunch counters by early 1961, schools remained segregated. Officials
hoped to forestall the widespread abandonment of the dual system by sanctioning piecemeal
desegregation at a few border schools. Token integration began in the summer of 1961 when two
black students enrolled at St. Petersburg Junior College. That fall a black attended Tomlinson
Vocational School, and a white matriculated in a vocational course at Gibbs. Although
African-American parents filed over nine hundred applications by October, nominal
desegregation of children did not begin until September 1962. At that time three blacks entered
secondary schools without incident. A year later, Superintendent Christian promised that the
district would no longer bus blacks away from the closest school. The school board claimed it
permitted 118 blacks living in white attendance zones to enroll in nearby white schools, thereby
creating a neighborhood system. While Christian praised this gradualist approach, the state's
NAACP leadership hoped to hasten the process by urging blacks to “shed their shackles of
inequality” and demand a plan which required whites to share the burden of integration.
According to the Florida Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission,
Pinellas school officials assigned a handful of blacks to white schools to feign compliance with
Brown and forestall further court action. But as blacks continued to receive little cooperation
from the district, they sought additional relief through the courts.15

The legal attack on Pinellas County’s dual system began with a class action suit filed in the
U.S. District Court in Tampa on May 7, 1964. Leon W. Bradley, Sr., a police officer and vice
president of the Clearwater NAACP, met with four other Clearwater residents and an individual
from St. Petersburg. This group agreed to challenge the school board’s gradualist strategy. The
NAACP Legal Defense Fund assigned a young attorney named James Sanderlin to the case. In
Bradley v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, Sanderlin argued that nearly a decade
after Brown, less than two percent of the county’s black pupils attended desegregated schools.
He contended that the district permitted whites to transfer to all-white schools, while blacks
could enroll in a white school only if it was the nearest facility. Although this policy violated
Title IV and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which forbade discrimination in federally
assisted programs, Pinellas County continued to secure federal funds.16
On January 15, 1965, the court ordered the district to present a comprehensive plan that
eliminated dual attendance zones and reassigned pupils, faculty, and other personnel on a
non-racial basis. On March 15, the school board claimed that all elementary schools and adult
programs operated on a unitary basis. It pledged to provide unitary zones for all remaining
facilities by the 1968-69 school year. To comply with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and receive
federal assistance, board members agreed to submit their plan to Washington. Although the
district continued to secure federal funds, only two-thirds of the county’s 107 primary and
secondary schools experienced desegregation by September 1965.17
While Sanderlin and the NAACP fought for a comprehensive plan, the school board quietly
integrated its postsecondary institutions. Trustees at St. Petersburg Junior College assumed
control of Gibbs Junior College and renamed it Skyway Campus. After attempts to bring whites
to this facility failed, the board decided to close Skyway and enhance academic programs on the
newly-opened Clearwater campus. This decision influenced desegregation struggles in other
counties as well. More than two-thirds of Gibbs’ students resided in Hillsborough, Polk,
Sarasota, and Manatee counties. When Pinellas officials prohibited school board members in
Bradenton from transporting students to Gibbs in August 1966, they assumed that Manatee
Junior College would enact an open admissions policy.18
Meanwhile, Sanderlin filed new motions to remedy inequalities at the primary and secondary
levels. Specifically, Sanderlin contended that the district refused to recruit teachers from black
colleges, maintained segregated athletic programs, and allowed white students residing in black
school zones to obtain special attendance permits. However, Federal Judge Joseph Lieb denied
these motions in November 1965 and April 1966. Judge Lieb ruled that school board members
did not have prior knowledge of the race of applicants granted permits or have any special plan
to segregate faculties and administrative personnel. Although 6,700 blacks attended desegregated
schools during the 1966-67 term compared to 739 pupils two years earlier, Sanderlin viewed
such statistics as misleading since most schools remained predominantly black or white.19
While local NAACP director Roy Holmes met with Superintendent Thomas Southard to
discuss the district's gradualist pace, Sanderlin continued to place his faith in the courts. He
realized that tokenism simply prolonged both economic and racial discrimination. Although there
was no significant difference for funding of black and white schools after 1962, every tradition
ally-black elementary school met the disadvantaged criteria of the 1965 Elementary and Second-

ary Education Act (ESEA). Even though Sanderlin argued that the county’s schools remained out
of compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he did not want the federal government to suspend
all funds. Pinellas County used ESEA Title I funds to supplement expenditures in black schools.
Additionally, Sanderlin knew that these facilities often lacked essential supplies because the
district purchased them with fees collected from students. For example, at one school so few
pupils could afford to pay the fee that the district did not provide mimeo paper for one month,
writing paper for three months, or soap for nearly a year.20 Disgusted by such conditions,
Sanderlin filed for further relief
Judge Lieb’s decision on March 6, 1969, ordered the district to enact a comprehensive
desegregation plan that took into account a Supreme Court ruling issued during the previous
term. In Green v. New Kent County the justices asserted that “freedom of choice” plans which
brought about little desegregation failed to convert districts into unitary systems. The Court
clearly expected school boards to correct past injustices as well as prevent future discrimination,
and it required school boards to abandon tokenism and create truly integrated systems.21
Therefore, when Judge Lieb approved a plan that retained all-black schools in August 1969,
Sanderlin petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Fifth Circuit modified the Bradley decision on July 29, 1970. The judges determined that
Pinellas County retained a dual system in violation of the Supreme Court’s decisions. The judges
did affirm that the district operated a unitary system with respect to majority-to-minority transfer
rights, extracurricular activities, facilities, and the assignment of faculty and staff. But they found
that single-school neighborhood zones preserved student segregation. During the 1969-70 term,
sixty-six percent of Pinellas County’s African-Americans attended predominantly black schools.
The modified plan approved by Judge Lieb would have reduced this figure by only two percent.
By clustering and pairing schools through common attendance zones, the Fifth Circuit Court
desegregated all but three of the county's schools.22
Although district officials instituted the clustering program during the fall of 1970, litigation
resumed in the courts. White residents in the Largo area hoped that Pinellas Circuit Court Judge
Charles R. Holley would invalidate the court-ordered clustering of five schools which they
viewed as an “illegal and void desegregation plan.” On September 14, 1970, Holley concurred
with the plaintiffs, noting that clustering apportioned different grade levels to each school. Such
a plan violated state statutes requiring all elementary schools to include the first six grades.
Meanwhile, Judge Lieb assailed the school board for keeping Gibbs High School open with a
predominantly black student body. NAACP officials contemplated further legal action as the
school board readily approved pupil transfers for whites from heavily-integrated city schools to
suburban enclaves. As many whites in southern Pinellas abandoned the public schools, both the
school board and black plaintiffs hoped to alter the court order, each for different reasons. While
the school board petitioned the United States Supreme Court to rescind the clustering plan, the
black plaintiffs wanted whites to share more of the burden. After the Supreme Court denied the
petition on May 3, 197 1, Sanderlin filed another motion.23
When the Pinellas County School Board finally adopted an effective countywide desegration
program on June 2, 1971, another U.S. Supreme Court decision played a pivotal role. In Swann
v. Charlotte -Mecklenburg, the Justices granted lower courts broad powers to order cross-district

busing if patterns of school construction, school abandonment, and pupil assignment indicated
that dual systems existed. Sanderlin had filed a motion in May 1971 that urged the District Court
to desegregate all schools by September. A week later board attorney John Carlson concurred
with Sanderlin and acknowledged for the first time that the district did operate a dual system.
Carlson realized that if the school board failed to enact an adequate plan, Judge Lieb could
impose more drastic measures. Board members also wanted to settle the issue. “This means too
much to the children,” Vice Chairman Calvin Hunsinger proclaimed. “I’ve come to the
conclusion that the parents and the county are waiting for this gutless board to make a decision.”
To the chagrin of Superintendent Nicholas Mangin and School Board Chairman Ron Fisher, a
majority ratified the revised plan and submitted it to Judge Lieb. Thus, Pinellas County became
the first system in Florida to approve a voluntary, all-inclusive desegregation plan.24
Judge Lieb, following the lead of higher federal courts, required Pinellas school officials to
comply with one of the most comprehensive desegregation plans in the United States. Because
school officials had acted in good faith, he did not believe the District Court needed to oversee
daily school operations. Instead, he ordered the district to abandon paired and clustered schools,
modify existing zone lines, and implement satellite zones for white elementary students. These
zones rotated on a biennial basis to avoid white flight. Additionally, no school’s black enrollment
could surpass the thirty-percent limit established by the court. Furthermore, he designated the
local branch of the NAACP as a third party to monitor the district's compliance with the order.
On July 23, 1971, Judge Lieb ordered full implementation of the new plan for the 1971-72
school year.25
Immediately, white opposition to busing intensified. The United Residents of Pinellas (URP)
and Parents Against Forced Busing (PAFB) never successfully merged, but their members
shared a common goal: They hoped to nullify the court decision and restore the concept of
neighborhood schools. While the URP usually restricted its activities to court litigation, PAFB
advocated outright defiance. PAFB Chairman Sam Buice, and members Gwen McCook and
Grace Tilka, dominated the organization. They prepared suits against the “funky five” board
members who had approved the plan, distributed school officials’ home telephone numbers, and
called for parents to seek exemptions to the compulsory attendance law by claiming they could
not properly clothe their children. When Superintendent Mangin invalidated most of the
petitions, PAFB leaders promised that over 20,000 pupils would boycott the opening day of
school.26
The PAFB found allies at the local, state, and national levels. Chairman Fisher wanted Judge
Lieb to vacate the order, and he brazenly supported PAFB’s attempts to help parents circumvent
attendance laws in direct violation of the district’s policy requiring individual board members to
“act impartially on principle, uninfluenced by personal prejudices, political considerations, or
mere popularity seeking.” At a large rally held at Al Lang field, members of the Pinellas County
legislative delegation condemned forced busing and supported a constitutional amendment
proposed by Congressman C.W. “Bill” Young. The amendment sought to prohibit cross-busing
to achieve artificial racial balances. The PAFB commended former Governor Claude Kirk for his
unyielding stand against busing by naming him honorary national chairman of the organization,
even though his attempts to interpose state sovereignty while governor had jeopardized Florida’s
public schools. Demagoguery flourished at the local level as grassroots leaders emulated

President Richard Nixon’s condemnation of the Supreme Court’s school desegregation
opinions.27
Many white Pinellas County residents repudiated PAFB's agenda as a mockery of justice, a
way to exacerbate racial tensions, and a threat to the region’s economic progress. They argued
that antibusing proponents confused the goal with the means. For decades the school board had
used buses to segregate pupils by race. The Bradley decision simply compelled the district to
redress past disparities by busing students as a means to attain the goal of integration. A
grassroots organization known as Citizens for the Preservation of Public Schools abated rumors
circulated by foes of integration. In their monthly newsletter, leaders of the biracial Upper
Pinellas Council on Human Relations called for a unitary system. Businessmen meeting at the St.
Petersburg Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution urging the district to enact a fair
countywide desegregation plan. In addition, the St. Petersburg Times consistently supported
busing on its editoral page.28
As classes resumed on September 7, 1971, PAFB’s threatened boycott never materialized.
Although Claude Kirk boasted that nearly 10,000 children stayed home, district records counted
only 2,000 no-shows. Indeed, during the first ten days of the term, almost 4,200 new students
matriculated in the system. These increased enrollments necessitated an extension of the
four-mill levy passed two years earlier, but the PAFB persuaded voters to reject a school
referendum for the first time in the county’s history. While PAFB supporters cheered as School
Board Chairman Ron Fisher defiantly campaigned alongside PAFB leaders, the millage’s defeat
on September 14 made children innocent victims of racial demagoguery. Sam Buice’s claim that
“if you vote for even one mill, you’re voting for a school bus” certainly appealed to many white
parents. But Floyd Christian, now serving as the state’s education commissioner, regretted that
parents voted against improvements in their children’s schools by refusing to extend the
millage.29
Funding matters notwithstanding, school officials implemented the desegregation plan.
Surprisingly, only two campuses – Dixie Hollins and Boca Ciega high schools – experienced
prolonged racial discord. In October 1971, a student biracial committee suggested that Dixie
Hollins drop the Confederate flag as its unofficial symbol. With PAFB support, a group known
as Parents and Students for Dixie organized motorcades to “restore equal rights to whites” by
brandishing the Rebel flag and harassing black “interlopers.” Black nationalist Joe Waller’s
Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) responded by organizing a boycott by black students.
Segregationists soon revived the Pinellas chapter of the White Citizens Council.30 Chairman Ron
Fisher reacted to the violence that seized Boca Ciega a month later by claiming, “The whites
aren’t going to take any more of what they've been taking.”31 Fortunately, racial tensions at Dixie
Hollins and Boca Ciega subsided by the end of the first semester.
Despite these problems, the district complied with court-imposed modifications to the plan,
and some schools took additional steps. A week after Judge Lieb died in 1971, Judge Ben
Krentzman issued the “now” order of November 9. Judge Krentzman stipulated that no school
could exceed the thirty-percent black enrollment limit, and he called for the immediate transfer
of students to bring the district into compliance.32 While the school board and the court evaluated
desegregation in terms of busing and pupil ratios, some leaders at individual schools fostered an

Floyd T. Christian, a 1933 graduate of St. Petersburg High School, went on to serve as
Superintendent of Public Instruction for Pinellas County from 1948 to 1965, when he became
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. He then assumed the new post of Commissioner of
Education, serving until 1974.

environment where students could move beyond desegregation to achieve integration. Therefore,
when school officials originally anticipated difficulties at Northeast and Gibbs High Schools,
administrators secured the confidence of the students, the faculty, and the community. Northeast
High School’s principal eased the transition for blacks by inviting them to the campus before the
fall term began and by establishing and supporting biracial committees. Leadership at Gibbs
High School preserved the black community’s historic ties to a school that became ninety-one
percent white.33
The district’s judicious administration of the court order resulted in both school and housing
market stability. Private school enrollments had nearly doubled between 1967 and 1972, before
the school board adopted a definitive plan, but fewer parents withdrew their children from public
schools after 1972. Residents in Pinellas County, as well as the state’s other counties, realized
that they could not move to a different municipality to avoid interracial schools. Florida’s 1968
revised constitution required school districts to coincide with county lines, and by the mid-1970s
all sixty-seven counties had desegregated their schools.34
The public reaffirmed its commitment to Pinellas County’s schools under Superintendent Gus
Sakkis. Board members promoted Deputy Superintendent Sakkis when Nicholas Mangin, a
superintendent who never welcomed desegregation, resigned under fire in June 1972. Sakkis, the
sixth superintendent in seven years, provided much-needed stability and integrity by becoming a
staunch supporter of desegregation. During his nine years as superintendent, he restored public
confidence to a system that had experienced student unrest, two teacher strikes, and declining
academic standards, as well as the busing controversy. He regarded busing as the quickest and
most efficient means of creating a unitary system. He concluded that most advocates of
neighborhood schools did not oppose busing per se, just busing for racial balance. 35
Organized and vociferous opposition to the court plan waned after the 1971-72 school year.
With the exception of a brief period of rioting at seven junior and senior high schools in
February 1973, the racial strife anticipated by anti-busing groups never materialized. PAFB and
the White Citizens Council disappeared by late 1973. The National Socialist White People’s
Party, formerly the American Nazi Party, protested at a few school board meetings but never
garnered support in the white community. Furthermore, leaders in the black community repudiated JOMO’s demands for autonomous black schools. James Sanderlin, who had become a
county judge, urged blacks to work within the system because militancy or separatism would
subvert past accomplishments.36
Ten years after the plan went into effect, the district commissioned a Pinellas County Task
Force on Busing to evaluate the court plan and offer suggestions. Jerry Castellanos, the newest
and youngest member on the school board, proposed that his colleagues vote to abolish the plan
because it victimized children who “had nothing to do with bringing about slavery, segregation,
or race problems.” Similar to Ron Fisher, Castellanos befriended anti-busing activists. The
Resident Organization for Academic Research (ROAR) formed in 1981 to call for an end to all
busing and to restore the concept of neighborhood schools. But the Task Force’s
recommendations prevailed, and the district made few changes in its desegregation plan.37

Black students were bused to Madeira Beach Middle School in the 1970s as part of the county’s
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Black leaders remained steadfast in their commitment to unitary schools. NAACP leaders like
Roy Holmes and Morris Milton worked with biracial advisory committees to assure that white
parents abided by the order. Holmes once remarked, “Let some of those white kids ride buses....
School bus seats aren’t for blacks only; whites can sit in them, too.” The NAACP’s vigilance
prevented school officials from closing facilities in black neighborhoods, and this required
whites to share the burden of busing. Citing the disproportionate number of black suspensions
during the late 1970s, the NAACP and the Council on Human Relations filed a suit to halt
racially discriminatory discipline policies.38 Although some black leaders instituted a “Sack
Sakkis” campaign during the late 1970s, they could not deny the progress achieved by the school
system during his term.
Since assuming the superintendency in 1981, Scott Rose has viewed busing as the only feasible
means of maintaining a unitary system. He realized that if the court lifted its order, candidates
would soon challenge current board members on the single issue of busing and resegregated
neighborhood schools would result. During the 1983-84 school year the district initiated two
programs at south county schools to attract students from throughout Pinellas. Students from as
far north as Tarpon Springs boarded buses to attend classes at the Artistically Talented Program
at Gibbs and the Program for the Academically Talented at St. Petersburg High School. Federal
Judge William Terrell Hodges approved a joint agreement between the district and the NAACP
to supplant the thirty-percent limit with a floating quota. This amendment allowed the school
board a grace period to redraw zone lines instead of requiring the immediate transfer of pupils to
restore compliance with the order. Criticism of racial desegregation abated throughout the
1980s.39
The busing controversy took on new dimensions as certain communities achieved residential
integration. By the mid-1980s Lakewood High School, centered in an integrated neighborhood in

southern St. Petersburg, fell out of compliance as the number of blacks exceeded the floating
limit. This situation posed a dilemma for the NAACP: In order to preserve the court order, it had
to compel the board to bus pupils out of an integrated community. When the school board
planned to transfer children from their Lakewood neighborhood to the Gandy area in
northeastern St. Petersburg, residents proud of their integrated community formed the Southside
Neighborhoods Coalition. This grassroots organization sought to become a party to the original
lawsuit and release the Lakewood area from the court order. But Perkins Shelton, executive
director of the local NAACP, and district officials argued that white flight and resegregation
would result if the District Court modified or closed the court order. In July 1990, Judge Hodges
concurred when he ruled against the Southside Neighborhoods Coalition. School officials may
resolve the imbroglio by placing a magnet school on the Lakewood campus, as they did at Gibbs
and St. Petersburg High Schools. Thus, the struggle continues to this day.40
In conclusion, efforts to dismantle Jim Crow education in Pinellas County required leadership
at the local level. Leaders in the black community considered equal educational opportunity an
important goal in the civil rights struggle. Dr. Ralph Wimbish, C. Bette Wimbish, and the
Reverend Enoch Davis demanded an end to the dual system during a period when rabid
segregationists threatened to abolish schools rather than desegregate them. The St. Petersburg
Times and local business leaders also advocated peaceful desegregation. They realized that a
massive resistance movement would jeopardize Pinellas County’s drawing power as a popular
destination for tourists and northern transplants. In addition, new grassroots leaders who emerged
in Pinellas County generally endorsed the busing plan. Since 1972, superintendents and board
members have resolutely asserted that busing helps blacks without hurting whites. To them, its
economic costs seem inconsequential when weighed against its benefits to the community.41
State and national leadership also contributed to the desegregation of Pinellas County’s
schools. Governor Claude Kirk’s defeat in 1970 signaled an end to demagoguery by the state
executive. After assuming the governorship in 1971, Reubin Askew became busing’s champion
and spokesman. He saw busing as a means to correct inequalities. In an address given at the
Florida PTA Congress in November 1971, Askew declared, “We must decide whether apartheid
is what we really want in this country – be it de facto or de jure.” State leaders of the Young
Democrats, League of Women Voters, NAACP, and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference praised his stand. Education Commissioner Floyd Christian, Pinellas County’s
superintendent from 1948 to 1965, also welcomed Askew’s leadership.42 James Sanderlin relied
on the national offices of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to support court litigation. The United
States District Court, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court each
provided a forum for civil rights lawyers to argue their cases. One federal judge that had an
important impact on the local movement was Judge Joseph Lieb, whose decisions legitimized
school desegregation plans throughout central Florida.43
Today the Pinellas County school system, with an enrollment of nearly 92,000, has the
twenty-first largest district in the nation and the fifth largest in Florida. The district provides
transportation for approximately 40,000 students each day, yet less than a quarter of those pupils
travel by bus to maintain compliance with the court order. Neither the school board nor the
NAACP considers busing a panacea, but they vigilantly defend the court order from critics who
seek a return to the mythic neighborhood school.44

Leon Bradley and a handful of other black parents forced the Pinellas County School Board to
fulfill its constitutional obligations. The elder Bradley had little sympathy for those who
complained about busing. He remembered when the district transported blacks from Tarpon
Springs to attend classes at the substandard black Pinellas High campus in Clearwater, even
though they passed by numerous white schools along the way.45 In retrospect, he revealed why
he became a party to the suit: “I was looking out for my own behalf Even if the rest of the blacks
didn’t give a damn . . . I wanted my kid to have a good education.”46 Leon Bradley, Jr., never
attended an integrated public school in Pinellas County. He neither testified in court nor paid a
penny in legal fees. Yet the court case that bears his name remains open today to assure that
Pinellas County's schools serve the best interests of all students.
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